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This paper aims at establishing the link bet
Levine (2004) – both in terms of variables
ﬁnancial depth. Using a panel GMM with 
index, microeconomic indicators, and our 
aggregate dynamics like consumption, inveonomic performance and ﬁnancial stability in the European Union. We use the seminal framework of Beck and 
onometric method – to estimate this causal relationship, independently from but controlling for the level of 
ntal variables, our contribution involves testing how different measures of ﬁnancial instability (an institutional 
tistical index derived from a principal component analysis) affect economic performance (or components of 
nd disposable income). We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial instability has a negative effect on economic growth.1. Introduction
This paper examines the causal relationship between macroeco-
nomic performance and ﬁnancial stability in the European Union
(EU). Opposing views emerged from the literature on the links be-
tween ﬁnance and economic performance. On the one hand, credit
is found to be determinant in the process of economic development.
The literature often recalls the Schumpeterian view that entrepre-
neurs need credit to ﬁnance their innovations. Banks and ﬁnancial
markets are then viewed as facilitators. On the other hand, ﬁnance
appears to respond to economic growth. With economic expansion,
ﬁrms and households are more likely to demand ﬁnancial services.
According to both views, the ﬁnance–growth relationship is constrained
by structural determinants such as the historical level of debt, the legalF and seminar participants at 
r we thank Christophe Blot, 
n, Piotr Banbula, Emmanuel 
Berkes, Andreas Tsopanakis, 
ful conversations, suggestions 
m funding by the European 
) under grant agreement no. environment and the level of economic development. Beyond this
ﬁnance–growth nexus, which has already given rise to an abundant lit-
erature, we investigate whether ﬁnancial instability affects macroeco-
nomic performance. This question matters for addressing the issue of
whether policymakers should implement policies aimed at ensuring
ﬁnancial stability.
A focus on the ﬁnancial stability issue is motivated from both an ac-
ademic and a policy perspective. This topic has come to the fore in the
academic debate since the crisis (Arcand et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2014;
Cecchetti andKharroubi, 2012). Amajor reason for addressing the ques-
tion of ﬁnancial stability is its nature as a public good: it is a non-rival
good since its use does not prevent someone else from the same use,
and it is non-excludable since no one can be deprived of its use. After ﬁ-
nancial crises, new regulations are proposed to supervise and frame the
ﬁnancial system to preserve its property as a public good (Cartapanis,
2011). In the case of a banking crisis at themicro-level, ﬁnancial stability
has to be preserved to prevent idiosyncratic shocks from generating a
systemic impact through different contagion links: contractual, infor-
mational or psychological (Borio, 2003). For instance, the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 affected the entire banking sys-
tem through several channels. Contractually, its creditors were the ﬁrst
to be hit. But very quickly, bankruptcywas analyzed as a severe negative
signal on the ﬁnancial markets and, in particular, on interbankmarkets.
This induced uncertainty and suspicion among banking institutions,
which swiftly became reluctant to participate in the money market.
These informational and psychological links were transmitted around
the world, and extreme tensions appeared on the European and US
money markets, affecting the real economy as a result. Moreover, pay-
ment systems are central to the smooth functioning of market econo-
mies, so ﬁnancial instability can potentially disrupt them.
From a policy perspective, European countries included ﬁnancial
stability in the European Treaty as an objective of the European
Central Bank (ECB). According to Article 127(2) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU, the ECB has to “smooth the conduct of pol-
icies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the ﬁnancial
system”. Beyond this mandate, it is difﬁcult to formulate the policy
to be achieved because of the difﬁculties in deﬁning, forecasting
and measuring ﬁnancial stability (Schinasi, 2004). In the absence of
a consensus, it is acknowledged that these regulations should at
least be implemented at the European level. The banking union is
one step in this direction. The EU is thus an appropriate level to
investigate the ﬁnancial stability–economic performance link,
particularly because, thanks to ﬁnancial integration and converging
prudential regulations, the European countries are relatively homog-
enous compared to the rest of the world.
We focus speciﬁcally on the ﬁnancially integrated and homoge-
nous economies of the EU, most of whose countries share the same
central bank and are part of a single ﬁnancial market. An analysis
of the ﬁnance–growth nexus, or the ﬁnancial stability–growth
nexus when advanced and developing countries are mixed, is
beyond the scope of this paper. Our study aims at providing evi-
dence about the effects of ﬁnancial stability on European aggregate
dynamics.
We assess the ﬁnancial stability–economic performance nexus
with the dynamic panel GMM estimations methodology of Beck
and Levine (2004), which we extend to the ﬁnancial stability
dimension. This framework relates ﬁnancial depth and economic
performance and has been used extensively in the literature, pro-
ducing results that are comparable across a wide array of contribu-
tions. We test whether ﬁnancial stability has a causal effect on
economic performance and its subcomponents – consumption, in-
vestment and disposable income – on different samples of EU coun-
tries. Our benchmark time sample is 1998–2011, because of the
ﬁnancial stability data availability, and we use proxy data to extend
the analysis from 1960 to 2011. The effect of ﬁnancial stability is
estimated independently of the level of ﬁnancial depth, but we
control for the latter in order to avoid capturing its speciﬁc effects.
We also control for a potential non-linear relationship between
ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnancial instability with interaction terms,
and ﬁnd that ﬁnancial instability affects economic performance
independently of the degree of ﬁnancial depth. We use different
ﬁnancial instability indicators that measure the macro- and
micro-dimensions of ﬁnancial stability: the Composite Indicator
of Systemic Stress (CISS) provided by the ECB, aggregate prudential
ratios for domestic banks for each country, stock market volatility,
and our own statistical index constructed from a principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA). We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial instability, captured
by the CISS and non-performing loans, has a negative effect on
economic performance. This result is robust to several panel
speciﬁcations and estimators. It is interesting to note that introducing
ﬁnancial stability in this framework does not alter theﬁnancial depth ef-
fect. While this result may seem intuitive, this paper provides quantita-
tive evidence on the negative effect of ﬁnancial instability on economic
performance. Financial instability, independently ofﬁnancial deepening,
has a negative effect on the economy.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial depth has no positive impact
on economic performance in the EU as a whole and in the euro
area, although results indicate a slightly positive impact in Central
and Eastern European countries prior to the Great Recession. Re-
sults support the view of Arcand et al. (2012) that the effect of ﬁ-
nancial depth on growth depends on the level of ﬁnancialdevelopment. While these results do not undermine the seminal
results that ﬁnancial depth has had a positive effect for developing
countries, they suggest that the level of ﬁnancial depth in the EU is
so advanced that it no longer has a positive effect on economic
growth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses themethod-
ology and results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Related literature
The paper is at the crossroads of two strands of the literature,
one studying the link between ﬁnance and economic growth, and
the other investigating the link between ﬁnancial instability and
growth.
2.1. Finance and economic performance
There have been different perspectives on the relationship between
ﬁnance and economic performance alongwith theoretical and empirical
controversy about the subject since the beginning of the XXth century
(Ang, 2008). The debate can be summarized as follows. Advocates of a
positive role of ﬁnance highlight that the development of ﬁnance in-
duces a better allocation of resources, mobilizes savings, can reduce
risks and facilitates transactions. The ﬁnancial sector acts as a lubricant
for the economy, ensuring a smoother allocation of resources and the
emergence of innovative ﬁrms. Cons recall that stock markets have
destabilizing effects and that ﬁnancial liberalization leads to ﬁnancial
crises. These more skeptical authors believe that the link between
ﬁnance and economic growth has been exaggerated (Rodrik and
Subramanian, 2009; Stiglitz, 2000). De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995)
argue that the link is tenuous or even non-existent in the developed
countries and suggest that once a certain level of economic wealth has
been reached, the ﬁnancial sector makes only a marginal contribution
to the efﬁciency of investment. It relinquishes its role as a facilitator
of economic growth in favor of its own growth. Banking and ﬁnancial
groups thus emerge that are “too big to fail”, enabling them to take
excessive risk since they know it will most certainly be mutualized
by the intervention of the public authorities. The fragility of these
groups rapidly transmits to other ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial corpo-
rations, hence to the real economy. The subprime crisis is a good ex-
ample of themagnitude of the effects of correlation and contagion on
ﬁnancial markets. Numerous empirical studies have investigated
these questions.
However, until recently, the literature highlighted a positive
relationship between ﬁnancial development and economic growth
(Bumann et al., 2013), drawing on cross-country, time series and
panel studies.
Cross-country studies, mixing countries with different levels of
development, generally found a positive effect of ﬁnance on eco-
nomic performance, with the notable exception of Ram (1999).
King and Levine (1993) found that ﬁnancial development indicators
are positively associated with capital accumulation, total factor pro-
ductivity growth and GDP growth. Focusing on stock markets,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Levine and Zervos
(1998) concluded that liquid stock markets are positively related to
GDP growth. But these cross-country studies suffer from severe lim-
itations. Most of them intend to quantify whether ﬁnance affects
economic performance, neglecting the reverse causality. To deal
with this endogeneity bias, they use instrumental variables, but as
demonstrated by Ahmed (1998), this technique is not robust when
data are averaged over decades, which is usually the case in these
studies. Another limitation of cross-country analyses is the grouping
of countries that are highly heterogenous. This problem was
highlighted by Ram (1999), who showed that, after deﬁning sub-
groups in his sample, an important parametric heterogeneity is
1 Philippon (2010) argued that theﬁnancial systemgrows faster than the real economy,
with the consequence that young talents aremore attracted by theﬁnancial sector than by
the non-ﬁnancial one.
2 Their main objective is to guarantee a protection for the consumers (investors, depos-
itors, etc.).
3 Their main objective is to avoid economic costs in terms of GDP or unemployment
stemming from ﬁnancial instability.observed. This is due to the fact that the link between ﬁnance
and economic performance is mainly determined by the ﬁnancial
structures, the legal environment, the preferences and the policies
implemented in each country (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997;
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).
Time series studies have been developed to counter the above-
mentioned limitations. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) compared the
ﬁnance–GDP growth link in Germany and in the United States. In
Germany they found a relationship from ﬁnancial development to real
GDP, whereas the reverse causal pattern held for the United States. Xu
(2000) also provided evidence of heterogeneity across countries.
Arestis et al. (2001) compared the inﬂuence of banks and stockmarkets
acrossﬁve developed countries. Their results showed that both promote
GDP growth, and also suggested that banks contribute more than the
stock markets. Moreover, they pointed out that stock market volatility
has had negative effects in Japan, France and the United Kingdom. But
these macro-studies suffer from small sample constraints. To preserve
degrees of freedom, the variables included in the analysis are kept to a
minimum, meaning that these studies might be subjected to the omit-
ted variable bias.
To address these issues and to combine the beneﬁts of cross-country
analysis and the time dimension, the literaturemoved to dynamic panel
estimation procedures. Most panel studies reach the conclusion that ﬁ-
nancial development has a positive effect on economic performance,
e.g. Beck et al. (2000), Rioja and Valev (2004), Rousseau and Wachtel
(2000), Beck and Levine (2004) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) with
industry-level data. Beck and Levine (2004) used dynamic panel
data estimation and developed an empirical methodology based on
Arellano and Bond (1991) that intends to take care of the endogeneity
bias. They explain GDP per capita growth by means of the usual
variables of endogenous growth theory (i.e. the initial GDP per
capita, the accumulation of human capital over the average years of
education, government consumption, trade openness and inﬂation)
and add to their model both credit to the private sector and the
turnover ratio as proxies of ﬁnancial depth. They found that ﬁnancial
development positively affects GDP growth. The turnover ratio and
credit to the private sector are both signiﬁcant, suggesting that
they complement each other. Nevertheless, the main conclusion –
that ﬁnance improves growth – needs to be moderated. Calderon
and Liu (2003) also found that ﬁnancial development generally
boosts economic growth, but they show that the causality from
economic growth to ﬁnancial development coexists. They found
that the ﬁnance–growth link is more active in developing countries
than in developed ones, and that the longer the sample, the larger
the effect of ﬁnancial development. Finally, Loayza and Ranciere
(2006) highlighted that ﬁnancial deepening has contrasting effects.
It positively inﬂuences growth in the long run but a negative effect
can be identiﬁed in the short run.
In an attempt to reconcile the divergent views expressed in the
literature, a nonlinear relationship between ﬁnance and economic
growth has been postulated. Arcand et al. (2012) extend Beck and
Levine (2004) by introducing the square of credit to the private sec-
tor in order to take account of the potential non-linearity of ﬁnancial
depth. They showed that the relationship between economic growth
and private sector credit is positive, but the relationship between
economic growth and the square of private sector credit (that is to
say, the effect of credit to the private sector when it is at a high
level) is negative. Taken together, these two factors indicate a
concave relationship between economic growth and credit to the
private sector: the relationship is positive up to a certain level of ﬁ-
nancial depth, but beyond a certain threshold, the effects of ﬁnancial
depth become negative. According to the different speciﬁcations
estimated by Arcand et al. (2012), the threshold (as a percentage of
GDP) lies between 80% and 100% of credit to the private sector.
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) came to similar results and make
clear that these thresholds should not be viewed as targets, butmore like “extrema” that might be reached only in times of crisis.
In “normal” times, it would be better for private debt levels to be
lower so as to give the economies some leeway in times of crisis. To
explain non-linearities, Aghion et al. (2005) and Fung (2009)
argued that ﬁnancial development helps catch-up the productivity
frontier; for countries close to the frontier, the positive effects from
ﬁnancial depth are limited or nonexistent.1 Beck et al. (2012)
insisted on the fact that the effect of ﬁnancial growth stems from
ﬁrms rather than from households. However, in developed countries,
ﬁnancial deepening originates from greater household lending. This
may explain the weakness of the ﬁnancial effect in high-income
countries. It is worth acknowledging that these explanations are
not mutually exclusive. They might even be mutually reinforcing
and create an excess of ﬁnance that would produce ﬁnancial
instability.
Beyond questions of non-linearity, ﬁnance can also have its own po-
tential negative effects. Indeed, liquidity and maturity transformation
from deposit and savings to long-term investment can improve
economic performance, but can also be damaging. Deregulation and
information asymmetries have encouraged banks to take more risks in
recent years. Combined with ﬁnancial deepening, this has led to exces-
sive lending and reinforced bubbles that give rise to ﬁnancial fragility.
The failure of ﬁnancial institutions can have strong negative exter-
nalities. Laeven and Valencia (2012) showed that banking crises
tend to have larger real effects in advanced economies. Output losses
are driven by larger banking systems, which deeply impact the entire
economy.
2.2. Financial stability
Financial stability relates to different aspects of ﬁnance, though it is
difﬁcult to deﬁne (e.g. Schinasi, 2004). On a micro-level, market struc-
tures (a high degree of concentration reinforces the contagion risks
from one bank to another) and ﬁnancial institutions themselves
(depending on whether their business model requires high or low
risk) impinge on ﬁnancial stability. On amacro-level, monetary stability
and the functioning of the payment system are important aspects of
ﬁnancial stability. These domains are organized and supervised by cen-
tral banks, supervisory authorities and private ﬁrms that ensure the
functioning of the system of payments between the ﬁnancial institu-
tions. Failures in the supervision or in the payment system may lead
to ﬁnancial instability.
One way to deﬁne ﬁnancial stability is to take into account
the ways to achieve it. Two main paradigms can be used to classify
ﬁnancial stability (see e.g. Borio, 2003): microprudential and
macroprudential. Microprudential policies try to limit ﬁnancial insti-
tutions' probability of bankruptcy and idiosyncratic shocks.2 Finan-
cial instability is exogenous to the ﬁnancial system, and risks
should be managed on an individual basis. This is a bottom-up ap-
proach, and spillover effects between institutions are irrelevant.
Macroprudential policies try to limit the occurrence of ﬁnancial crisis
in order to limit its impact on welfare. They focus on the economic
system as a whole and are aimed at circumscribing shocks that may
have a macro-impact.3 Risks come from the system itself, and the
spillovers between institutions are important. Financial stability is
generated through a top-down perspective, guaranteed by the
actions of the main ﬁnancial institutions.
The complexity of deﬁning ﬁnancial stability conceptually also
involves ways to quantify it. Loayza and Ranciere (2006) measure
ﬁnancial fragility as the standard deviation of the private credit/GDP
ratio over non-overlapping 5-year averages. The ECB has developed a
Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) for the euro area as a
whole (Hollo et al., 2012), which has been available since 1999; it
gives an appreciation of macroeconomic ﬁnancial stability. At the
micro-level, several authors capture ﬁnancial stability in the banking
sector through the Z-score (Fink et al., 2009; Uhde and Heimeshoff,
2009), which measures the probability of default for a bank or a
banking system. This indicator suffers from several limitations
(Cihák et al., 2012). Using the ﬁnancial stress index developed by
the IMF for thirteen industrialized economies,4 Proano et al. (2013)
analyze the extent to which the effect of the sovereign debt-to-GDP
ratio on economic growth depends on ﬁnancial stability. They ﬁnd
that the debt-to-GDP ratio impairs growth only when ﬁnancial stress
is high.
3. Data
To quantify the links between ﬁnancial depth, ﬁnancial stability and
economic performance in the EU, our dataset is composed of country-
variables from the 27 EU member states as of 2011.5 We use annual
data between 1998 and 2011.6
3.1. Economic performance
The main indicator of economic performance is the real GDP
per capita growth rate, as in many papers dedicated to the real im-
pact of ﬁnance. Following Stiglitz et al. (2009), who indicate that
two other macro-aggregates are relevant to explain economic
performance, we also test the real disposable income per capita
growth rate and the household consumption per capita growth
rate. Finally, we analyze the impact of ﬁnance on private invest-
ment growth, measured as the growth rate of real gross ﬁxed cap-
ital formation.
3.2. Explanatory variables
In order to compare our results with the conclusions of the
literature, we include the same set of explanatory variables: initial
economic performance per capita, average years of education,
government consumption over GDP, trade openness and inﬂation.7
All these variables are expressed in log units.8 Beyond these vari-
ables, we include measures of ﬁnancial depth. Beck and Levine
(2004) use total credit to the private sector from deposit banks.
This measure was adequate until the 1990s, but it is now more rele-
vant to include total credit to the private sector by deposit banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions. We also include the stock market
turnover ratio.
To take the macroeconomic dimension of ﬁnancial stability into
account, we include the CISS developed by the ECB for the euro
area. The CISS includes 15 raw measures, mainly of market-based ﬁ-
nancial stress, which are split equally into ﬁve categories, namely the
ﬁnancial intermediaries sector, money markets, equity markets,
bond markets and foreign exchange markets. The CISS places rela-
tively more weight on situations in which stress prevails4 This is a composite indicator comprising information on banking-sector volatility,
stock market returns, stock market volatility, sovereign debt spreads, and an exchange
market pressure index, very similar in spirit to the CISS for the EU.
5 Croatia only joined the EU in July 2013.
6 Due to ﬁnancial stability data availability constraints, our benchmark time sample be-
gins in 1998. Nevertheless, we also test our hypothesis on a longer period (1960–2011)
using the standard deviation of the private credit/GDP ratio as a proxy for ﬁnancial stabil-
ity. The results are reported in Table H in the Appendix and discussed in Section 4.4.
7 We also test government expenditures instead of government consumption.
8 To deal with zero value in inﬂation rates, we apply the inverse hyperbolic sine trans-
formation used by Arcand et al. (2012): ðx^ ¼ ln xþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x2 þ 1
p 
:simultaneously in several market segments. It is unit-free and
constrained to lie within the unit interval (see Hollo et al., 2012). Un-
fortunately, this aggregate indicator exists neither at the country
level nor for the entire EU. However, thanks to strong ﬁnancial, mon-
etary and trade integration in the EU, it is reasonable to assume that
the evolution of macroeconomic ﬁnancial stability in the EU is highly
correlated with ﬁnancial stability in the euro area, hence the rele-
vance of the CISS.
Moreover, to capture the microeconomic dimension of ﬁnancial
stability, we use some aggregate prudential ratios such as the ratio
of non-performing loans to gross loans, which is relevant as
a warning signal for systemic banking insolvency (Cihak and
Schaeck, 2010). We also test the banking Z-score and stock market
volatility.
Finally, we also construct a statistical ﬁnancial stability index
from a principal component analysis (FSI-PCA) based on various
aggregate prudential ratios.9 The ﬁrst component comprises bank
capital to total assets, net interest margin, bank non-performing
loans to gross loans, stock market capitalization growth rate, return
on assets, return on equity and liquid assets to deposits and short-
term funding. It is estimated with a principal component analysis
and is therefore a linear combination of the seven preceding vari-
ables, maximizing the common variance explained between these
variables. The ﬁrst component captures most of the common
variance and the following orthogonal components contain less
and less information than the preceding components. For the 27
countries in the sample, the ﬁrst component has an eigenvalue
(the variance of the component) comprised between 2.75 and
4.56 (a value superior to one means that the component captures
more variance than its nominal share of the total variance of
variables) and explains between 0.39 and 0.65% of the common
variance of the series. Measures of sampling adequacy – the Kai-
ser–Meyer–Olkin (which compares the partial correlations and
correlations between variables) and SMC (Squared Multiple Corre-
lations of variables with all other variables) – support the relevance
of PCA on the selected variables.10 Our index of FSI-PCA is negative-
ly correlated with variables of ﬁnancial instability, except the Z-
score. In that sense, FSI-PCA must be viewed as an indicator of
ﬁnancial stability. When the FSI-PCA index increases, ﬁnancial
stability increases.
All the variables are described in Table A in the Appendix. Descrip-
tive statistics are presented in Table B, and the correlation matrix
between all variables is shown in Table C.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Methodology
Following Beck and Levine (2004), we estimate the relationship
between ﬁnance and GDP growth using the GMM estimator developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991). The regression equation can be described
in the following form:
yi;t ¼ βyi; t−1 þ γXi;t þ δZi;t þ εi;t ð1Þ
where subscripts i and t represent respectively the country and time
period, yi,t is the dependent variable of economic performance, yi,t − 1
represents its lagged value, Xi,t is a set of explanatory variables typically
used in this type of study, Zi,t includes explanatory variables of ﬁnancial9 We have also constructed variants of this new ﬁnancial stability index including, or
not, some prudential ratios. The characteristics of the FSI-PCA and the estimation results
remain similar.
10 Principal component analysis estimates are available upon request.
12 If the model is speciﬁed as a panel with ﬁxed or random effects (see Section 4.3), the
theoretical “endogenous-growthmodel” seems toﬁt the datawell. In contrastwith FE andstability, and εi,t is the error term that includes country-speciﬁc and
time-speciﬁc effects.
Some econometric issues arise from estimating this equation.
First, variables included in Xi,t and Zi,t may not be fully exogenous,
and causality may run in both directions. Second, the country
ﬁxed-effects contained in the error term can be correlated with the
explanatory variables. Third, the panel dataset has a relatively
short time dimension and a large country dimension. These three is-
sues can be addressed with the two-step GMM estimator proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) in which the set of instrumental vari-
ables is constituted by the lagged values of all explanatory variables,
including yi,t− 1. Moreover, Arellano and Bond (1991) rewrite Eq. (1)
in ﬁrst difference:
Δyi;t ¼ βΔyi;t−1 þ γΔXi;t þ δΔZi;t þ Δεi;t : ð2Þ
By transforming the regressors in ﬁrst difference, the country
ﬁxed-effect is removed, but a new bias is potentially introduced:
the new error term can be correlated with the lagged dependent var-
iable. Under the assumption that the error term is not serially corre-
lated and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous,
Arellano and Bond (1991) deﬁne the following procedure. In the
ﬁrst step of their GMM estimator, error terms are assumed to be
homoskedastic and independent over time and across countries.
Then, in the second step residuals obtained in the ﬁrst step are
used to build a consistent estimate of the variance–covariance
matrix. Assumptions of independence and homoskedasticity are
then relaxed, making the two-step estimator asymptotically more
efﬁcient than the ﬁrst-step one.
We obtain robust standard errors using the Windmeijer (2005)
ﬁnite sample correction. The assumption of no serial correlation in the
error terms is crucial for the consistency of the GMM estimator. We re-
port the standard speciﬁcation tests. Failure to reject the null hypothesis
of the serial correlation tests implies that error terms are not serially
correlated.
The use of a large number of instruments may lead to over-
identiﬁcation. In order to avoid this, we use variables in level as in-
struments only up to three lags instead of using all their history.
The p-value of the Sargan test is included at the bottom of each
table of results. We do not reject the null hypothesis that our instru-
ments are valid.
Our estimation strategy differs from earlier ones since we do not
use average data in our dynamic panel estimations.11 Beck and
Levine (2004) and Arcand et al. (2012) use average data in order to
quantify the long-term relationship between ﬁnance and economic
performance. Their data are usually averaged over 5-year periods
to disentangle credit cycle effects. In addition to the argument by
Ahmed (1998), we do not follow this assumption for two other rea-
sons. First, business cycles measured by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) in the United States and by the Center for
Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in Europe are longer than ﬁve
years. Measures of ﬁnancial cycles (Drehmann et al., 2012) show
that ﬁnancial cycles have a much lower frequency than traditional
business cycles. Their average duration has increased since the
1980s and is now around 20 years, making 5-year average data
unable to ﬁt the duration of these cycles. Second, it may be worth in-
vestigating not only the long-term effects of ﬁnance on economic11 We include average data as a robustness check.performance but also its short-term effects: the use of average data
disregards the latter.4.2. Preliminary results
In a ﬁrst step, we replicate on our sample the seminal estimations
of the literature. The overall ﬁt of the model in column (1) of Table 1
is consistent with Beck and Levine (2004). Initial economic perfor-
mance, trade openness and government consumption are signiﬁcant
with the usual sign. Average years of education and inﬂation are,
on the contrary, not signiﬁcant.12 Other speciﬁcations, with non-
linearity and/or other indicators of economic performance give rela-
tively similar outcomes.
It is quite noteworthy that these ﬁrst estimations show that the level
of ﬁnancial depth in the EU as awhole is not a signiﬁcant positive deter-
minant of economic performance. Estimations with four different
economic performance measures (GDP growth per capita, household
consumption growth per capita, disposable income growth per capita
and investment growth) all show that when ﬁnancial depth is proxied
by the ratio of the amount of credit provided to the private sector by
banks and other ﬁnancial institutions over GDP, no improvement in
economic performance should be expected from an increase in allocat-
ed credit.13
Moreover, this measure of ﬁnancial depth sometimes has a signiﬁ-
cant negative effect. These results are consistent with recent works
that have established a limit for the positive effects of ﬁnancial depth
(Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). The latter show
that beyond an unobserved threshold, negative effects may start to ap-
pear. We also performed additional estimations including the squared
GDP per capita or the squared ratio of credit to GDP to the benchmark
model to evidence the potential non-linear effects of the levels of eco-
nomic or ﬁnancial development. The squared ratios are not statistically
signiﬁcant, and their inclusion does not affect the previous result. In the
Robustness tests section, we discuss alternative measures of ﬁnancial
depth, but none of them undermine the results presented hereafter.4.3. Financial stability and economic performance
Wenow turn to the effects of ﬁnancial stability on aggregate dynam-
ics. The effects of ﬁnancial stability are estimated independently of,
though controlling for, the level of ﬁnancial depth so as to avoid captur-
ing with ﬁnancial stability indices the speciﬁc effects of ﬁnancial depth.
With the CISS index, we take into account the macroeconomic dimen-
sion of ﬁnancial stability. We test two indicators of microeconomic
ﬁnancial stability, non-performing loans and the Z-score. We test the
impact of stock market volatility and our own FSI-PCA measure. Since
the microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions of ﬁnancial stabil-
ity are strongly linked, we test each micro-ﬁnancial stability measure
individually and then jointly with the macroeconomic CISS. Estimates
are reported in Table 2 for GDP growth, and in Tables D, E and F in the
Appendix, for consumption growth, disposable income growth and
investment, respectively.RE panels, the benchmark model corrects for the endogeneity bias.
13 Onemay argue that the single ﬁnancial market in the EU has led to large cross-border
ﬁnancial ﬂows and ﬁnancial integration. Traditional measures of ﬁnancial depthmay thus
underestimate the true level of ﬁnancial integration and cross-border banking.We control
for thepotential effect of the development of cross-border banking byusing theBIS ratio of
consolidated foreign claims to GDP. The inclusion of this variable does not alter our results.
They are available from the authors upon request.
Table 1
Benchmark dynamic panel estimations.
GDP/cap. growth rate Consumption/cap. growth rate Disp. income/cap. growth rate Investment growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Private credit −0.066⁎ −0.046 0.052 −0.044 −0.057⁎ 0.160 −0.057 −0.104⁎⁎ 0.092 −0.196⁎⁎⁎ −0.203⁎⁎⁎ −0.399⁎⁎⁎
[0.04] [0.00] [0.15] [0.04] [0.03] [0.16] [0.06] [0.05] [0.16] [0.04] [0.08] [0.23]
Turnover ratio −0.001 −0.003 0.000 −0.013 −0.016 −0.015 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.019 0.000 0.000
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
School 0.094 0.113 0.05 0.035 0.092 0.035 0.021 0.138 −0.003 0.552⁎ 0.793⁎⁎ 0.551⁎
[0.10] [0.22] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.15] [0.11] [0.10] [0.32] [0.31] [0.33]
Gov. consump. −0.384⁎⁎⁎ −0.377 −0.419⁎⁎⁎ −0.139 −0.169 −0.158 −0.321⁎⁎⁎ −0.394⁎⁎⁎ −0.281⁎⁎⁎ −0.791⁎⁎⁎ −0.729⁎⁎⁎ −0.692⁎⁎
[0.12] [0.44] [0.11] [0.15] [0.15] [0.13] [0.12] [0.10] [0.10] [0.17] [0.15] [0.29]
Inﬂation rate 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.009⁎⁎ 0.010⁎⁎ 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.005
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Trade openness 0.279⁎ 0.295 0.205 0.301⁎⁎⁎ 0.243⁎⁎ 0.250⁎⁎ 0.224⁎ 0.117 0.270⁎ 0.213 0.356⁎⁎ 0.283
[0.14] [0.20] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] [0.13] [0.13] [0.17] [0.16] [0.16] [0.23] [0.22]
Initial econ. perf. −0.101⁎ 0.288 −0.08 −0.122⁎⁎ −0.341⁎⁎ −0.191⁎⁎⁎ −0.082 −0.583 −0.162⁎⁎ −0.000⁎⁎⁎ −0.000⁎⁎ −0.000⁎⁎⁎
[0.05] [1.85] [0.08] [0.05] [0.14] [0.06] [0.07] [0.69] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Squared GDP/cap. −0.023 0.013 0.03 −0.008⁎
[0.10] [0.01] [0.04] [0.00]
Squared priv.
credit
−0.032 −0.054 −0.049 0.061
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
Constant 0.995⁎ −0.754 1.306⁎ 0.419 1.411⁎ 1.181⁎ 0.964 3.39 1.416⁎ 0.611 0.048 0.166
[0.53] [10.06] [0.79] [0.54] [0.85] [0.63] [0.70] [3.23] [0.80] [0.82] [0.87] [1.59]
Sargan test p-val. 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.989
AR1 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.0466
AR2 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.45 0.4 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.1 0.01 0.1441
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 26 26 26 27 27 27
Obs 246 246 246 243 243 243 223 223 223 240 240 240
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial depth on four economic performances. All regressions are estimated
with annual data from 1998 to 2011 using theﬁrst-differenced GMMestimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard speciﬁcation tests. Robust (Windmeijer) standard
errors are in brackets. Malta is the missing country in regressions 7, 8 and 9. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.First, the introduction of ﬁnancial stability measures in the model
does not affect the impact of ﬁnancial depth: it remains nil when eco-
nomic performance is proxied by GDP growth per capita, and it remains
often negative when economic performance is proxied by investment
growth. Second, macroeconomic ﬁnancial stability, proxied by the
CISS, appears negatively related to GDP and investment growth. Non-
performing loans also have a negative impact on GDP, consumption
and disposable income growth. Consistently with the limits of the
Z-score evoked by Cihak et al. (2013), we do not ﬁnd that this variable
affects economic performance. The inclusion of stockmarket volatility is
only signiﬁcant in the investment growth equation, and still with a
negative sign. We ﬁnally include the FSI-PCA that we constructed with
aggregate prudential ratios. This variable has a signiﬁcant and positive
effect on all the dependent variables. Because the FSI-PCA measures
ﬁnancial stability rather than instability, the effect means that the
deterioration of banks' aggregate prudential ratios negatively impacts
economic performance, in accordance with previous outcomes. In addi-
tion, in order to control for potential non-linearity between ﬁnancial
stability and ﬁnancial depth, we include an interaction term between
these two variables. These terms are not signiﬁcant; hence, ﬁnancial
instability affects economic performance independently of the degree
of ﬁnancial depth.14
To sum up, there is a clear pattern in these estimates of a negative
relationship between ﬁnancial instability and economic performance.
This relationship is robust to different measures of ﬁnancial stability,
and to different measures of economic performance.14 These results are available upon request.4.4. Robustness tests
To assess the sensitivity of our results to data or econometric choices
further, we present several robustness tests.15 First, we include other
variables to proxyﬁnancial depth,making a distinction among the insti-
tutions that provide ﬁnancial services to the economy. Data disentangle
the total assets of deposit banks from those of the other ﬁnancial
institutions.
Second, we test the robustness of Arellano–Bond's estimator.We es-
timate the equivalent empirical model with both ﬁxed- and random-
effects. Hausman tests indicate that the individual effects and the set
of explanatory variables are systematically related, so that the ﬁxed
effects (FE, also called the “within group”) estimator is the most appro-
priate choice. The FE estimator, which allows for varying intercept terms
across countries, deals efﬁciently with unobserved heterogeneity, as
time-invariant omitted variables do not bias the regression results.
This proves especially important when unobservable variables, such as
ﬁnancial markets and banking industry characteristics, and regulatory
rules and institutions, may be important in explaining the effects of
ﬁnancial stability on economic performance. An FE estimator has the ad-
vantage of controlling for different national effects of stable unobserved
variables, and over our short sample we may assume those unobserv-
able variables are stable. The appropriateness of our FE estimation was
also conﬁrmedby an F-test for the signiﬁcance ofﬁxed effects. However,15 We only present here results for GDP growth. Results for other measures of economic
performance are available upon request to the authors.
Table 2
Dynamic panel estimations— GDP per capita growth rate and ﬁnancial stability.
GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Private Credit −0.021 −0.031 −0.054 −0.038 −0.029 0.012 −0.036 −0.037 −0.005
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
Turnover Ratio −0.006 −0.017 −0.003 −0.008 −0.005 −0.020⁎ −0.005 −0.007 −0.012
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
School 0.039 0.162 0.059 0.121 0.155 0.166 0.07 0.099 0.124
[0.10] [0.16] [0.10] [0.11] [0.13] [0.17] [0.11] [0.13] [0.13]
Gov. Consump. −0.349⁎⁎ −0.399⁎⁎ −0.388⁎⁎⁎ −0.399⁎⁎⁎ −0.452⁎⁎⁎ −0.447⁎⁎⁎ −0.368⁎⁎⁎ −0.371⁎⁎⁎ −0.424⁎⁎⁎
[0.14] [0.17] [0.15] [0.14] [0.11] [0.10] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12]
Inﬂation rate 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.003
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]
Trade Openness 0.316⁎⁎⁎ 0.21 0.322⁎⁎ 0.239⁎⁎ 0.205 0.159 0.282⁎⁎⁎ 0.268⁎ 0.296⁎⁎
[0.11] [0.17] [0.16] [0.11] [0.18] [0.19] [0.10] [0.16] [0.13]
Initial Econ. Perf. −0.112⁎⁎⁎ −0.139⁎⁎⁎ −0.123⁎⁎ −0.099⁎ −0.114⁎ −0.126⁎⁎ −0.114⁎⁎⁎ −0.089⁎ −0.135⁎⁎⁎
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
CISS −0.054⁎⁎ −0.043⁎⁎ −0.040 −0.044 −0.034
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Non Perf. Loans −0.011⁎⁎⁎ −0.010⁎⁎
[0.00] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 0.000
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility 0.000 0.000
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003⁎ 0.003⁎
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.926 1.502⁎⁎ 1.107⁎ 1.054⁎ 1.406⁎⁎ 1.669⁎⁎⁎ 1.064⁎ 0.829 1.214⁎
[0.70] [0.73] [0.62] [0.61] [0.58] [0.48] [0.55] [0.62] [0.68]
Sargan test p-val. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
AR1 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
AR2 0.08 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.29 0.16 0.10 0.01 0.07
Countries 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 26 27
Obs 246 219 245 206 214 219 245 206 214
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnancial instability on GDP per capita growth. All regressions are
estimatedwith annual data from1998 to 2011using theﬁrst-differencedGMMestimator. The bottomof the table reports thep-values of standard speciﬁcation tests. Robust (Windmeijer)
standard errors are in brackets. We also introduced interaction terms between private credit and ﬁnancial stability variables. The present results are robust and the interaction terms are
not signiﬁcant. Austria is the missing country in regressions 4 and 8. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.it also often makes sense to treat the unobserved effects as random
draws from the population, and this approach is appropriate from an
omitted variables or heterogeneity perspective. Therefore, we also
estimate the panel with random-effects (RE). Last, the Wooldridge
test for autocorrelation in panel data indicated a ﬁrst-order correlation,
and we therefore use both FE and RE estimators robust to an AR distur-
bance term.
Third, we take into account the long-term effects pointed out by
Beck and Levine (2004) and estimate regressions with average vari-
ables. To take into account the fact that credit growth is cyclical, we
split our sample of 14 years into 7 non-overlapping 2-year periods
and into 3 non-overlapping 5-year periods.
Fourth, onemay argue that our sample is too large on the country di-
mension and composed of small economies that are highly dependent
on their ﬁnancial sector, such as Luxembourg and Cyprus. Another
issue is that new EUmember countries with different levels of ﬁnancial
market development and integration may have different results from
the original EU countries. To take these issues into account, we estimate
our benchmark equation ﬁrst for the 12 ﬁrst member states of the euro
area, leaving aside Luxembourg, and, second, for the Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs).16
Fifth, we test and provide evidence that our results are robust to
a longer sample period starting in 1960 with or without the recent
crisis period. Because of the absence before 1998 of the ﬁnancial16 Because of constraints on thenumber of degrees of freedom,we estimate our equation
with a panel GMM using the same instrumental variables deﬁned previously.stability data that we used up to here, we estimate the effect
of ﬁnancial stability on growth following Loayza and Ranciere
(2006) and proxy ﬁnancial stability with the standard deviation
of the private credit/GDP ratio. It is worth stressing that estimating
the effects of ﬁnancial instability in periods during which
there is less ﬁnancial instability might mechanically generate less
effect.
The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 for the robustness to
ﬁnancial depth indicators and to alternative estimators, respectively.
Table G in the Appendix provides estimates for 2-year and 5-year
averages. Table H in the Appendix provides estimates for country
sub-samples, and Table I for a longer time sample and for a sample
excluding the Great Recession. All robustness checks using our ﬁnan-
cial stability data conﬁrm our main result that ﬁnancial instability
harms economic performance, both for the euro area and CEECs.
Using the proxy variable of Loayza and Ranciere (2006) on a longer
sample, we found that ﬁnancial instability has damaging effects
on growth for advanced economies, even without the Great Reces-
sion, which is the main source of ﬁnancial instability. For CEECs,
the results are more contrasted. All these results suggest that the
link between ﬁnancial stability and economic growth might
depend on the ﬁnancial integration and market structures of
countries.5. Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between macroeconomic
performance and ﬁnancial stability. We use the framework of Beck
Table 3
Robustness — ﬁnancial depth.
GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Private credit 0.012
[0.09]
Deposit bank's assets −0.069 −0.003 −0.003 0.002 −0.017 −0.015 −0.042 −0.001
[0.11] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.06] [0.05]
Non-bank's assets 0.008 0.01 0.003 0.001 0.009 −0.01 0.005 −0.002
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.04]
Financial assets 0.005 0.029
[0.01] [0.03]
Squared ﬁn. assets −0.004
[0.00]
Turnover ratio 0.002 −0.018 −0.016 −0.015 −0.02 −0.02 0.001 −0.029 −0.005 −0.013
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.04]
School 0.101 0.055 0.089 0.016 0.084 0.057 0.043 −0.052 0.224 0.121
[0.07] [0.25] [0.24] [0.18] [0.16] [0.14] [0.17] [0.30] [0.16] [0.14]
Gov. consump. −0.373⁎⁎ −0.433⁎⁎⁎ −0.446⁎⁎⁎ −0.429⁎⁎⁎ −0.335⁎⁎ −0.496⁎⁎⁎ −0.387⁎⁎⁎ −0.349⁎⁎⁎ −0.415⁎⁎⁎ −0.455⁎⁎⁎
[0.18] [0.14] [0.16] [0.13] [0.15] [0.13] [0.14] [0.13] [0.14] [0.17]
Inﬂation rate 0.005 0.003 0.003 −0.001 0.005 0.003 0.002 0 0.002 0.008
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Trade openness 0.258 0.476 0.471 0.528 0.439⁎ 0.302⁎ 0.486⁎ 0.476⁎⁎ 0.277 0.109
[0.17] [0.32] [0.30] [0.33] [0.26] [0.18] [0.27] [0.21] [0.18] [0.14]
Initial econ. perf. −0.106 −0.289⁎⁎⁎ −0.294⁎⁎⁎ −0.313⁎⁎⁎ −0.255⁎⁎ −0.199⁎⁎⁎ −0.264⁎⁎⁎ −0.199⁎⁎⁎ −0.135⁎⁎ −0.074
[0.07] [0.10] [0.09] [0.11] [0.10] [0.06] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.09]
CISS −0.057⁎⁎ −0.024
[0.03] [0.05]
Non-perf. loans −0.013⁎⁎⁎ −0.010⁎
[0.00] [0.01]
Z-score 0.001 0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility −0.002⁎⁎⁎ 0.000
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003 0.000
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 1.054 2.175⁎⁎⁎ 2.210⁎⁎⁎ 2.297⁎⁎⁎ 1.654⁎⁎⁎ 2.227⁎⁎⁎ 1.842⁎⁎⁎ 1.381⁎⁎⁎ 1.059⁎ 1.478⁎⁎
[0.65] [0.58] [0.62] [0.43] [0.58] [0.46] [0.60] [0.48] [0.56] [0.73]
Sargan test p-val. 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
AR1 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.08
AR2 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.38 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.13
Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 25 26 25
Obs 225 249 249 249 249 229 248 208 202 174
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnancial instability on GDP growth per capita. We test in particular
various indicators of ﬁnancial depth.We include deposit money bank assets to GDP (%).We also include the sum of the pension fund assets to GDP + mutual fund assets to GDP + insurance
assets toGDP. This sum is called “non-bank's assets”. Financial assets are the sumof the deposit bank's assets and non-bank's assets. All regressions are estimatedwith annual data from1998 to
2011 using the ﬁrst-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard speciﬁcation tests. Robust (Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. Malta is
missing in all regressions and Austria is missing in regressions 8 and 10. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.and Levine (2004)who developed a dynamic panel estimationmeth-
odology dealing with endogeneity. We test whether ﬁnancial stabil-
ity affects economic performance. We use several types of indicators
that measure the macro- and micro-dimensions of ﬁnancial stability.
One is calculated by the ECB, two are based on banking aggregate
prudential ratios, one is market-related (it measures stock market
volatility), and ﬁnally we construct one with a principal component
analysis. In most cases, the use of these indicators shows that ﬁnan-
cial instability has a negative effect on economic performance, and
their inclusion does not affect the ﬁnancial depth effect. Financial in-
stability – independently from ﬁnancial deepening – has a negative
effect on the economy.
We also found that ﬁnancial depth does not have a positive effect
in the euro area. It therefore appears that ﬁnancial depth in the euro
area has reached a level such that ﬁnance effects are not favorable to
economic performance. Moreover, this also suggests that the argu-
ment by the banking lobbies, i.e. that regulating the size and growthof the ﬁnancial sector would negatively impact the growth of the
economies in question, is not supported by EU data.
Although our sample already makes it possible to identify the ef-
fects of ﬁnancial instability, further insights can be gained once larg-
er datasets become available. Many dimensions of ﬁnancial stability
data need to be improved to understand this issue more thoroughly.
Most of the series have been available only recently and at the aggre-
gated level, and better knowledge could be obtained from longer and
ﬁner ﬁnancial stability data. Moreover, although this study controls
for country ﬁxed effects, incorporating and focusing on the impact
of institutions, ﬁnancial market structures and regulations would
also provide further insights into the link between ﬁnancial stability
and economic performance. Finally, another avenue for future re-
search relates to the policy implications of our main result. It will
be interesting to assess the regulatory and policy tools that
policymakers will use in order to tackle the effect of ﬁnancial
instability.
Table 4
Robustness — alternative estimators.
GDP Fixed effect Random effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Private credit −0.027 −0.002 −0.071⁎⁎⁎ −0.023 −0.001 −0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.015 −0.036⁎⁎⁎ −0.013 −0.027⁎⁎⁎ −0.036⁎⁎⁎ −0.024⁎⁎ −0.025⁎⁎ −0.009
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Turnover ratio −0.009 −0.014 −0.012 −0.010 −0.021 −0.005 −0.024⁎ 0.017⁎ 0.007 0.006 0.017⁎ 0.006 0.011 −0.006
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
School 0.214⁎⁎⁎ 0.255⁎⁎⁎ 0.343⁎⁎⁎ 0.207⁎⁎ 0.181⁎ 0.323⁎⁎⁎ 0.291⁎⁎⁎ 0.036 0.069⁎⁎ 0.058⁎ 0.034 0.032 0.04 0.078⁎⁎
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Gov. consump. −0.379⁎⁎⁎ −0.323⁎⁎⁎ −0.178⁎⁎⁎ −0.381⁎⁎⁎ −0.379⁎⁎⁎ −0.220⁎⁎⁎ −0.238⁎⁎⁎ −0.154⁎⁎⁎ −0.092⁎⁎⁎ −0.145⁎⁎⁎ −0.153⁎⁎⁎ −0.096⁎⁎⁎ −0.137⁎⁎⁎ −0.098⁎⁎⁎
[0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Inﬂation rate 0.011⁎⁎ 0.013⁎⁎⁎ 0.014⁎⁎⁎ 0.011⁎⁎ 0.008 0.013⁎⁎⁎ 0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.016⁎⁎⁎ 0.016⁎⁎⁎ 0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.013⁎⁎⁎ 0.016⁎⁎⁎ 0.017⁎⁎⁎
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Trade openness 0.238⁎⁎⁎ 0.208⁎⁎⁎ 0.255⁎⁎⁎ 0.243⁎⁎⁎ 0.231⁎⁎⁎ 0.241⁎⁎⁎ 0.213⁎⁎⁎ 0.030⁎⁎ 0.021⁎ 0.003 0.029⁎⁎ 0.017 0.012 −0.004
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Initial econ. perf. −0.167⁎⁎⁎ −0.135⁎⁎⁎ −0.121⁎⁎⁎ −0.168⁎⁎⁎ −0.153⁎⁎⁎ −0.111⁎⁎⁎ −0.097⁎⁎⁎ −0.017⁎⁎ −0.017⁎⁎⁎ −0.035⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎ −0.029⁎⁎⁎
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
CISS −0.084⁎⁎⁎ −0.125⁎⁎⁎ −0.133⁎⁎⁎ −0.095⁎⁎⁎
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02]
Non-perf. loans −0.005⁎⁎⁎ −0.005⁎⁎ −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.005⁎⁎⁎
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Volatility −0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 −0.002⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.004⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.005⁎⁎⁎ 0.000
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constant 1.370⁎⁎⁎ 0.913⁎⁎⁎ 0.016 1.379⁎⁎⁎ 1.362⁎⁎⁎ 0.118⁎⁎⁎ 0.189⁎⁎ 0.479⁎⁎⁎ 0.254⁎⁎ 0.713⁎⁎⁎ 0.480⁎⁎⁎ 0.457⁎⁎⁎ 0.480⁎⁎⁎ 0.510⁎⁎⁎
[0.20] [0.22] [0.06] [0.21] [0.25] [0.04] [0.08] [0.13] [0.11] [0.12] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12]
R2 adj. 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.47 – – – – – – –
R2 within 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.56 0.28 0.34 0.41 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.52
R2 between 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.68 0.56 0.59 0.73 0.76 0.60 0.73 0.73 0.85
Obs. 293 293 264 291 237 257 215 320 320 291 318 263 284 241
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect ofﬁnancial depth andﬁnancial instability onGDP growth per capita. All regressions arewith annual data from1998 to 2011ﬁxed or randomeffects. Data
source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table A
Data description and sources.
Data Frequency Description Source
Economic performance (i.e. dependent variable)
GDP growth rate per capita Annual Real GDP per capita (log ﬁrst difference) Eurostat
Disposable income growth
per capita
Annual Real disposable income (log ﬁrst difference) Eurostat
Consumption growth rate per
capita
Annual Households consumption in volume (log ﬁrst difference) Eurostat
Private investment growth
rate
Annual Gross ﬁxed capital formation, millions of euros (log ﬁrst difference) Eurostat
Seminal independent variables
Inﬂation Annual Annual growth rate of harmonized Index of Consumer Prices Eurostat
Trade openness Annual Average of total trade (i.e. the sum of exports and imports of
goods and services) relative to GDP
Eurostat
Government consumption Annual Value of goods and services purchased or produced by general
government and directly supplied
to private households for consumption purposes relative to GDP.
Eurostat
School Annual Average year of schooling United Nations
Financial depth indicators
Private credit to GDP Annual Financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic
money banks as a share of GDP.
Domestic money banks comprise commercial banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand deposits.
World Bank
Turnover ratio Annual Stock market turnover ratio: Total value of shares traded during the period
divided by the average market capitalization for the period.
World Bank
Financial stability indicators
National banking stability (Z
score)
Annual The Z-score combines in one single indicator the banks' proﬁtability
(l), capital ratio (k) and return volatility (r). Obviously, the Z-score
will increase with the banks' proﬁtability and capital
ratio, and decrease with increasing return volatility. Thus, from
an economic viewpoint the Z-score initially measures the probability
of a bank to become insolvent when the
value of assets becomes lower than the value of debt. Hence, a higher
(lower) Z-score implies a lower (higher) probability of insolvency risk.
World Bank
Non-performing loans Annual Ratio of defaulting loans (payments of interest and principal past due
by 90 days or more) to total
gross loans (total value of loan portfolio). The loan amount recorded
as nonperforming includes the gross value of the loan as on the balance
sheet, not just the amount that is overdue.
World Bank
FSI-PCA Annual Financial stability indicator estimated through a principal component analysis based on banking
aggregate prudential ratios
Own calculations
Composite indicator
of systemic stress
Weekly
extrapolated
annually
It comprises the ﬁve arguably most important segments of an economy's
ﬁnancial system: the sector of bank and non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries,
money markets, securities (equities and bonds) markets as well as foreign
exchange markets.
ECB
Volatility of stock price index Annual Volatility of stock price index is the 360-day standard deviation of the
return on the national stock market index.
(Bloomberg) World
Bank
Table B
Summary descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Economic performance (i.e. dependent variable)
GDP growth rate per capita 378 0.054 0.067 −0.200 0.288
Consumption growth rate per capita 375 0.053 0.064 −0.217 0.288
Disposable income growth per capita 355 0.053 0.070 −0.214 0.270
Investment growth rate 372 0.025 0.109 −0.503 0.479
Seminal independent variables
School 378 2.302 0.141 1.792 2.573
Inﬂation 378 1.703 0.784 −1.301 4.772
Trade openness 374 3.995 0.459 3.202 5.223
Government consumption 378 2.995 0.145 2.542 3.395
Financial depth indicators
Private credit to GDP 344 0.931 0.576 0.063 2.881
Turnover ratio 378 0.618 0.529 0.001 2.596
Financial stability indicators
Composite indicator of systemic stress 351 0.214 0.160 0.066 0.560
Z-score 376 12.500 7.768 −3.449 40.862
Non-performing loans 343 4.746 5.011 0.100 31.600
Stock markets volatility 295 26.104 10.410 11.503 65.187
FSI-PCA 332 0.159 3.783 −29.396 8.147
Appendix A
Table C
Correlation coefﬁcients.
GDP/cap. Cons./cap. Disp. income/cap. Invest. School Inﬂation Trade open. Gov. cons. Private credit Turnover ratio CISS Z-score Non-perform. loans Volat. FSI-PCA
GDP/cap. 1
Consumption/cap. 0.94⁎⁎⁎ 1
Disposable income/cap. 0.95⁎⁎⁎ 0.91⁎⁎⁎ 1
Investment 0.66⁎⁎⁎ 0.59⁎⁎⁎ 0.64⁎⁎⁎ 1
School 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.11⁎⁎ 1
Inﬂation 0.39⁎⁎⁎ 0.41⁎⁎⁎ 0.43⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎ 0.05 1
Trade openness 0.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.11⁎ 0.12⁎⁎ 0.03 0.52⁎⁎⁎ 0.08 1
Govern. consumption −0.31⁎⁎⁎ −0.27⁎⁎⁎ −0.28⁎⁎⁎ −0.2⁎⁎⁎ 0.17⁎⁎⁎ −0.32⁎⁎⁎ −0.16⁎⁎⁎ 1
Private credit −0.48⁎⁎⁎ −0.47⁎⁎⁎ −0.48⁎⁎⁎ −0.36⁎⁎⁎ −0.04⁎⁎⁎ −0.39⁎⁎⁎ 0.02 0.15⁎⁎⁎ 1
Turnover ratio −0.23⁎⁎⁎ −0.22⁎⁎⁎ −0.24⁎⁎⁎ −0.04 −0.07 −0.16⁎⁎⁎ −0.46⁎⁎⁎ 0.34⁎⁎⁎ 0.28⁎⁎⁎ 1
CISS −0.46⁎⁎⁎ −0.36⁎⁎⁎ −0.44⁎⁎⁎ −0.53⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎ −0.1⁎ 0.11⁎⁎ 0.17⁎⁎⁎ 0.34⁎⁎⁎ 0.00 1
Z-score −0.07 −0.10⁎ −0.10⁎ 0.07 −0.17⁎⁎⁎ −0.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.14⁎⁎⁎ −0.09⁎ 1
Non-performing loans −0.13⁎⁎⁎ −0.13⁎⁎ −0.13⁎⁎ −0.22⁎⁎⁎ 0.00 0.08 −0.10⁎ −0.10⁎ −0.23⁎⁎⁎ −0.18⁎⁎⁎ 0.09 −0.27⁎⁎⁎ 1
Volatility −0.40⁎⁎⁎ −0.35⁎⁎⁎ −0.4⁎⁎⁎ −0.45⁎⁎⁎ 0.08 −0.07 −0.05 0.17⁎⁎⁎ 0.03 −0.02 0.55⁎⁎⁎ −0.07 0.24⁎⁎⁎ 1
FSI-PCA 0.47⁎⁎⁎ 0.46⁎⁎⁎ 0.46⁎⁎⁎ 0.42⁎⁎⁎ 0.05 0.28⁎⁎⁎ 0.15⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎ −0.32⁎⁎⁎ −0.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.26⁎⁎⁎ 0.15⁎⁎ −0.60⁎⁎⁎ −0.24⁎⁎⁎ 1
This table reports the correlation coefﬁcients between the main variables used in this paper. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table D
Dynamic panel estimations— consumption per capita growth and ﬁnancial stability.
Consumption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Private credit −0.052 0.018 −0.023 −0.044 0.010 −0.027 −0.052 −0.061 0.002
[0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.06]
Turnover ratio −0.015 −0.015 −0.014 −0.011 −0.016 −0.023 −0.012 −0.014 −0.02
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
School 0.051 0.049 0.061 −0.102 0.12 0.054 0.046 −0.002 0.111
[0.07] [0.11] [0.09] [0.14] [0.12] [0.08] [0.05] [0.10] [0.09]
Gov. consump. −0.198⁎ −0.172⁎ −0.17 −0.114 −0.229 −0.161 −0.205 −0.208 −0.287⁎⁎
[0.12] [0.10] [0.30] [0.21] [0.32] [0.12] [0.14] [0.13] [0.13]
Inﬂation rate 0.009⁎ 0.018⁎⁎ 0.008 0.014⁎⁎ 0.01 0.015⁎⁎⁎ 0.011⁎ 0.014⁎⁎⁎ 0.014⁎⁎⁎
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01]
Trade openness 0.235⁎⁎ 0.164⁎ 0.303 0.241 0.272 0.179⁎ 0.210⁎⁎ 0.098 0.177
[0.10] [0.09] [0.20] [0.18] [0.23] [0.11] [0.10] [0.13] [0.12]
Initial econ. perf. −0.109⁎⁎⁎ −0.115⁎⁎ −0.148⁎⁎⁎ −0.044 −0.152⁎⁎⁎ −0.109⁎⁎ −0.101⁎⁎⁎ −0.023 −0.126⁎⁎
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.08] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07] [0.05]
CISS 0.030 0.030 0.026 0.049 0.018
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Non-perf. loans −0.007⁎⁎⁎ −0.008
[0.00] [0.01]
Z-score 0.001 0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility 0.000 −0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003⁎ 0.003
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.668 0.893⁎ 0.622 0.175 0.811 0.776 0.725 0.617 1.124⁎
[0.51] [0.51] [1.17] [1.14] [1.42] [0.58] [0.55] [0.55] [0.64]
Sargan test p-val. 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
AR1 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.02
AR2 0.26 0.21 0.38 0.49 0.20 0.19 0.60 0.44 0.38
Countries 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 26 27
Obs 243 216 243 205 212 216 243 205 212
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnancial instability on consumption growth per capita. All regres-
sions are estimated with annual data from 1998 to 2011 using the ﬁrst-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard speciﬁcation tests. Robust
(Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. Austria is the missing country in regressions 4 and 8. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table E
Dynamic panel estimations— disposable income per capita growth and ﬁnancial stability.
Disposable income (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Private credit −0.03 0.004 −0.050 −0.059 0.011 −0.014 −0.049 −0.039 0.003
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06]
Turnover ratio −0.004 −0.012 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.006 0.001 −0.001 −0.004
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
School −0.008 0.04 0.051 −0.033 0.061 −0.002 −0.021 −0.049 0.03
[0.13] [0.16] [0.16] [0.19] [0.18] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] [0.10]
Gov. consump. −0.288⁎⁎⁎ −0.352⁎⁎⁎ −0.362⁎⁎⁎ −0.253 −0.444⁎⁎⁎ −0.292⁎⁎⁎ −0.281⁎⁎ −0.299⁎⁎⁎ −0.397⁎⁎⁎
[0.11] [0.11] [0.13] [0.19] [0.08] [0.10] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10]
Inﬂation rate 0.009⁎⁎ 0.009 0.009⁎ 0.007 0.01 0.011⁎⁎ 0.008 0.014 0.01
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Trade openness 0.279⁎⁎ 0.259⁎ 0.22 0.428 0.224⁎ 0.248 0.27 0.216 0.242
[0.12] [0.16] [0.18] [0.34] [0.13] [0.16] [0.19] [0.19] [0.17]
Initial econ. perf. −0.118⁎⁎ −0.157⁎⁎⁎ −0.096 −0.135 −0.122⁎⁎⁎ −0.123⁎⁎⁎ −0.102 −0.06 −0.124⁎⁎
[0.05] [0.05] [0.07] [0.12] [0.04] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05]
CISS −0.028 −0.029 −0.031 −0.019 −0.036
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
Non-perf. loans −0.007 −0.006⁎⁎
[0.00] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 0.000
[0.00] [0.00]
Table E (continued)
Disposable income (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Volatility 0.000 0.000
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003⁎⁎⁎ 0.003⁎⁎⁎
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 1.028⁎⁎ 1.566⁎⁎⁎ 1.137 0.57 1.538⁎⁎⁎ 1.226⁎⁎ 0.957⁎ 0.87 1.452⁎⁎
[0.46] [0.57] [0.70] [1.02] [0.56] [0.54] [0.53] [0.67] [0.59]
Sargan test p-val. 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
AR1 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04
AR2 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01
Countries 26 26 26 24 26 26 26 24 26
Obs 223 199 223 187 195 199 223 187 195
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnancial instability on disposable income per capita growth. All
regressions are estimated with annual data from 1998 to 2011 using the ﬁrst-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard speciﬁcation tests. Ro-
bust (Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. Malta is missing in all regressions and Austria and Luxembourg are missing in regressions 3 and 8. Data source: World Bank, United
Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table F
Dynamic panel estimations— investment growth and ﬁnancial stability.
Investment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Private credit −0.079⁎ −0.183⁎⁎⁎ −0.202⁎⁎⁎ −0.064 −0.192⁎⁎⁎ −0.094 −0.092 −0.035 −0.09
[0.05] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.09]
Turnover ratio 0.001 0.015 0.012 0.035 0.025 0.015 −0.009 0.024 0.02
[0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04]
School 0.268 0.478 0.624⁎⁎⁎ 0.335 0.728⁎⁎ 0.245 0.454 0.313 0.266
[0.27] [0.30] [0.22] [0.26] [0.30] [0.21] [0.28] [0.30] [0.26]
Gov. consump. −0.630⁎⁎ −0.846⁎⁎⁎ −0.813⁎⁎⁎ −0.748⁎⁎⁎ −0.825⁎⁎⁎ −0.573⁎⁎⁎ −0.741⁎⁎⁎ −0.525 −0.626⁎⁎⁎
[0.25] [0.17] [0.18] [0.20] [0.14] [0.22] [0.28] [0.38] [0.23]
Inﬂation rate 0.017⁎ 0.008 0.014⁎⁎⁎ 0.01 0.01 0.020⁎⁎ 0.015 0.019 0.012
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Trade openness 0.207 0.022 0.203 0.016 0.067 0.17 0.16 0.149 0.186
[0.19] [0.18] [0.13] [0.16] [0.12] [0.19] [0.21] [0.20] [0.22]
Initial econ. perf. 0 −0.000⁎⁎ −0.000⁎⁎⁎ −0.000⁎⁎ −0.000⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.000 −0.000⁎ 0.000
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
CISS −0.214⁎⁎* −0.188⁎⁎⁎ −0.204⁎⁎⁎ −0.178⁎ −0.160⁎⁎
[0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.10] [0.07]
Non-perf. loans −0.009 −0.007
[0.01] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 0.000
[0.00] [0.00]
Volatility −0.002⁎⁎⁎ −0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.007⁎⁎⁎ 0.006⁎
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.612 1.712⁎⁎ 0.548 1.644 0.931⁎ 0.684 0.734 0.411 0.72
[1.04] [0.76] [0.77] [1.20] [0.55] [1.17] [1.02] [1.54] [1.00]
Sargan test p-val. 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98
AR1 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02
AR2 0.40 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.48 0.18 0.19
Countries 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 26 27
Obs 240 216 240 202 212 216 240 202 212
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnancial instability on investment. All regressions are estimated
with annual data from 1998 to 2011 using theﬁrst-differenced GMMestimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard speciﬁcation tests. Robust (Windmeijer) standard
errors are in brackets. Austria is the missing country in regressions 4 and 8. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
l (continued)
Table G
Robustness tests — 2-year and 5-year averages.
GDP/cap. growth rate 2-year average 5-year average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Private credit −0.039 −0.019 −0.049 −0.033 0.001 −0.045 −0.019 −0.018 −0.018 −0.001 −0.020 −0.015 −0.015 −0.009
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.01]
Turnover ratio −0.016 −0.019 −0.012 −0.015 −0.025 0.004 −0.016 −0.043⁎ −0.046⁎⁎ −0.028⁎ −0.039⁎⁎ −0.041⁎ −0.028 −0.025⁎
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
School 0.411⁎ 0.511⁎ 0.407⁎⁎ 0.434⁎ 0.416⁎ 0.408⁎⁎ 0.522⁎⁎⁎ 0.141 0.146 0.141⁎ 0.124 0.145⁎ 0.098 0.027
[0.23] [0.27] [0.18] [0.23] [0.23] [0.18] [0.16] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.10] [0.07]
Gov. consump. −0.376⁎⁎⁎ −0.346⁎⁎⁎ −0.283⁎ −0.339⁎⁎⁎ −0.317⁎⁎ −0.276⁎ −0.263⁎⁎ −0.181⁎⁎ −0.187⁎⁎ −0.237⁎⁎⁎ −0.165⁎⁎ −0.162⁎⁎⁎ −0.177⁎ −0.201⁎⁎
[0.14] [0.12] [0.15] [0.11] [0.13] [0.16] [0.12] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.10] [0.09]
Inﬂation rate −0.001 −0.005 0.003 0.003 −0.002 0.005 −0.015 0.007 0.006 −0.003 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.001
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Trade openness 0.148 0.142 0.065 0.145 0.136 0.077 −0.07 0.166⁎ 0.171⁎⁎ 0.06 0.190⁎⁎ 0.164 0.169⁎⁎ 0.05
[0.11] [0.11] [0.08] [0.11] [0.12] [0.14] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.10] [0.08] [0.08]
Initial econ. perf. −0.232⁎⁎⁎ −0.201⁎⁎⁎ −0.167⁎⁎⁎ −0.249⁎⁎⁎ −0.182⁎⁎⁎ −0.155⁎⁎⁎ −0.036 −0.124⁎⁎⁎ −0.127⁎⁎⁎ −0.100⁎⁎⁎ −0.127⁎⁎⁎ −0.126⁎⁎⁎ −0.137⁎⁎⁎ −0.102⁎⁎
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04]
CISS −0.082 −0.016 0.006 0.083
[0.05] [0.06] [0.04] [0.12]
Non-perf. loans −0.008⁎⁎⁎ −0.010⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Z-score 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Volatility −0.002⁎⁎ −0.002⁎ 0.000 −0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.005⁎⁎ 0 −0.002 −0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constant 1.969⁎⁎⁎ 1.374⁎⁎ 1.436⁎⁎ 1.948⁎⁎⁎ 1.377⁎⁎ 1.215⁎⁎⁎ 0.483 0.829 0.844⁎ 1.194⁎⁎⁎ 0.781 0.791⁎ 1.044⁎⁎ 1.443⁎⁎
[0.53] [0.54] [0.61] [0.49] [0.60] [0.29] [0.84] [0.53] [0.46] [0.41] [0.49] [0.48] [0.48] [0.58]
Sargan test p-val. 0.21 0.12 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.25 0.91 0.05 0.12 0.27 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.62
AR1 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.31 0.07 0.38 0.26 0.30 0.12
AR2 0.67 0.62 0.31 0.98 0.51 0.08 0.07 – – – – – – –
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 26 25 27 27 27 27 27 27 26
Obs 73 73 67 73 70 65 62 53 53 52 53 49 52 49
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial depth andﬁnancial instability onGDP growth per capita. All regressions are estimated using 2-year non-overlapping average data from1998
to 2011 using the ﬁrst-differenced GMM estimator. The bottom of the table reports the p-values of standard speciﬁcation tests. Robust (Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. Austria is missing in regressions 6 and 7 and Cyprus in 7. Data
source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table H
Robustness tests — country sub-samples.
GDP/cap. growth rate 1998–2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EZ Newcomers
Private credit −0.032⁎⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.029⁎⁎⁎ −0.030⁎⁎⁎ −0.071 −0.059 −0.009 −0.042
[0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Turnover ratio 0.016⁎⁎⁎ 0.012⁎⁎⁎ 0.003 0.008⁎⁎ 0.041⁎ 0.041 0.032 0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
School −0.022 0.000 0.017 −0.006 −0.012 −0.11 0.273⁎⁎ 0.363⁎⁎
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.17]
Gov. consump. −0.045⁎⁎⁎ −0.030⁎⁎ −0.063⁎⁎⁎ −0.053⁎⁎⁎ −0.283⁎⁎⁎ −0.306⁎⁎⁎ −0.231⁎⁎⁎ −0.224⁎⁎⁎
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07]
Inﬂation rate 0.018⁎⁎⁎ 0.018⁎⁎⁎ 0.017⁎⁎⁎ 0.018⁎⁎⁎ −0.001 0.006 0.016⁎⁎ 0.015⁎
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Trade openness 0.032⁎⁎⁎ 0.024⁎⁎⁎ 0.010 0.019⁎⁎⁎ 0.062⁎ 0.078⁎⁎ −0.066⁎⁎ −0.071
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04]
Initial econ. perf. −0.016 −0.016 −0.017 −0.006 −0.042⁎⁎ −0.031 −0.083⁎⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
CISS −0.065⁎⁎⁎ −0.09
[0.01] [0.06]
Non-perf. loans −0.003⁎⁎⁎ −0.006⁎⁎⁎
[0.00] [0.00]
FSI-PCA 0.003⁎⁎⁎ 0.008⁎⁎⁎
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.251⁎⁎⁎ 0.190⁎⁎ 0.335⁎⁎⁎ 0.195⁎ 1.104⁎⁎⁎ 1.234⁎⁎⁎ 1.141⁎⁎⁎ 0.838⁎⁎⁎
[0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.10] [0.35] [0.34] [0.30] [0.31]
Obs 127 127 118 116 93 93 82 77
R2 0.56 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.24 0.29 0.45 0.42
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial instability on GDP growth per capita. Estimations are realized with a panel
GMM using the same instrumental variables as before from 1998 to 2011. Note that the 12 ﬁrst countries minus Luxembourg compose the euro area and that the newcomers' group is
composed of Central and East European Countries. Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table I
Robustness tests — country sub-samples & longer period.
GDP/cap.
growth rate
1960–2011 (starts in 1993 for newcomers) Excluding the Great Recession
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All EZ Newcomers All EZ Newcomers All EZ Newcomers All EZ Newcomers
Private
credit
−0.863⁎⁎⁎ −0.915⁎⁎⁎ 0.184 −0.877⁎⁎⁎ −0.859⁎⁎⁎ 0.373 −0.871⁎⁎⁎ −0.693⁎⁎⁎ 1.299⁎ −0.791⁎⁎⁎ −0.622⁎⁎⁎ 0.142
[0.24] [0.19] [0.44] [0.24] [0.19] [0.53] [0.27] [0.21] [0.73] [0.25] [0.20] [1.11]
School 0.468 0.064 6.878⁎⁎⁎ 0.531⁎ 0.087 7.138⁎⁎⁎ 0.395 −0.091 5.011⁎⁎⁎ 0.449 −0.113 3.397⁎
[0.34] [0.39] [2.24] [0.32] [0.37] [2.37] [0.36] [0.44] [1.76] [0.34] [0.42] [2.06]
Gov.
consump.
−0.322⁎ −0.599⁎⁎⁎ 0.013 −0.335⁎ −0.571⁎⁎⁎ 0.278 −0.446⁎⁎ −0.674⁎⁎⁎ 0.230 −0.433⁎ −0.660⁎⁎⁎ 0.287
[0.19] [0.17] [0.46] [0.20] [0.17] [0.50] [0.22] [0.17] [0.40] [0.23] [0.17] [0.42]
Inﬂation
rate
−1.073⁎⁎⁎ −1.052⁎⁎⁎ −1.348⁎ −1.053⁎⁎⁎ −1.072⁎⁎⁎ −1.317 −1.140⁎⁎⁎ −1.100⁎⁎⁎ −1.904⁎⁎ −1.154⁎⁎⁎ −1.094⁎⁎⁎ −1.682⁎⁎
[0.21] [0.20] [0.77] [0.21] [0.19] [0.89] [0.24] [0.20] [0.80] [0.24] [0.18] [0.80]
Trade
openness
0.633⁎⁎ 0.703⁎⁎ 0.479 0.624⁎⁎ 0.759⁎⁎ 0.424 0.792⁎⁎ 0.493⁎ 0.140 0.854⁎⁎⁎ 0.558⁎⁎ −0.866
[0.26] [0.33] [0.55] [0.25] [0.33] [0.62] [0.31] [0.27] [0.57] [0.31] [0.27] [0.74]
Initial econ.
perf.
−2.101⁎⁎⁎ −1.555⁎⁎⁎ −3.933⁎⁎⁎ −2.095⁎⁎⁎ −1.673⁎⁎⁎ −4.322⁎⁎⁎ −1.873⁎⁎⁎ −1.198⁎⁎ −1.303⁎⁎ −2.069⁎⁎⁎ −1.258⁎⁎⁎ −1.375⁎
[0.44] [0.43] [0.67] [0.43] [0.41] [0.64] [0.50] [0.51] [0.60] [0.47] [0.47] [0.83]
FSI-Sd −0.288 −0.846⁎ 2.769 −0.109 −0.783⁎ 4.388
[0.68] [0.48] [2.21] [0.72] [0.44] [2.70]
Constant 2.058⁎⁎⁎ 2.220⁎⁎⁎ −5.440⁎⁎ 2.121⁎⁎⁎ 2.362⁎⁎⁎ −6.588⁎⁎⁎ 2.263⁎⁎⁎ 2.421⁎⁎⁎ −0.770 2.253⁎⁎⁎ 2.550⁎⁎⁎ −0.469
[0.19] [0.17] [2.52] [0.23] [0.16] [2.33] [0.20] [0.19] [2.08] [0.24] [0.21] [2.38]
Obs 167 87 27 164 87 26 140 76 18 138 76 21
R2 0.57 0.70 0.52 0.57 0.71 0.60 0.47 0.64 0.52 0.47 0.65 0.55
This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed at estimating the effect of ﬁnancial instability on GDP growth per capita. Estimations are realized with a panel
GMMusing the same instrumental variables as before. Results are presented for two longer periods and for three country sub-sample. The sample for all the EU countries and the Eurozone
(EZ) starts in 1960 and ends in 2011whereas the newcomers' sample only starts in 1993. These estimations are based on non-overlapping 5-year average. The sample Excluding the Great
Recession is also based on non-overlapping 5-year average data. It goes from 1960 to 2008 for the EU and the EZ and begins in 1993 for newcomers. Note that the 12 ﬁrst countriesminus
Luxembourg compose the EZ and that the newcomers' group is composed of Central and East EuropeanCountries. Due to the absence ofﬁnancial stability variables before 1998,weuse as a
ﬁnancial stability variable the standard deviation of private credit/GDP (FSI-Sd). Data source: World Bank, United Nations, ECB & Eurostat.
⁎ p b 0.1.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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